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Abstract
This paper provides a long-term cost-benet analysis for the United Kingdom of the Basel III
capital and liquidity requirements proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(BCBS, 2010a). We provide evidence that the Basel III reforms will have a signicant net
positive long-term eect on the United Kingdom economy. The estimated optimal tangible
common equity capital ratio is 10% of risk-weighted assets, which is larger than the Basel III
target of 7%. We also estimate the maximum net benet when banks meet the Basel III long-
term liquidity requirements. Our estimated permanent net benet is larger than the average
estimates of the BCBS. This signicant marginal benent suggests that UK banks need to
increase their reliance on common equity in their capital base beyond the level required by
Basel III as well as boosting customer deposits as a funding source.
JEL Classication: C32; C53; G01; G21; G28
Keywords: Basel III, Cost-Benet analysis, Tangible Common Equity Capital, Liquidity
1. Introduction
Banking crises have been much more frequent than we would like. The annual probability
of a crisis is 4-5% in both industrial and emerging market countries (Walter, 2010). There are
many factors that contribute to the vulnerability of the banking sector. At the top of the list
are too little high-quality capital and too much unsecured liquidity. Moreover, banking crises
are usually associated with signicant economic losses. In order to promote nancial stability,
the Basel Committee (BCBS, 2010a) has therefore established stronger capital and liquidity
requirements (i.e. Basel III).
This paper assesses the long-term United Kingdom economic impact of the Basel III cap-
ital and liquidity requirements (the `the requirements'). The results suggest that, in terms
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2Reader in Economicsof the impact on output, there is considerable room to further tighten capital and liquidity
requirements, while still providing positive eects for the United Kingdom economy.
Similar to the cross-country analyses conducted by the Basel Committee on Banking Su-
pervision (BCBS)(2010b) and Angelini et al. (2011), the benet of the requirements is assumed
to be represented by the forestalled loss (in terms of the level of GDP) of a banking crisis,
which in turn is determined by the extent to which the requirements reduce the probability
of a banking crisis occurring and the associated GDP loss. Therefore, we identify the benet
of the new requirements as the reduction in the probability of a banking crisis multiplied by
the expected loss arising from a one-o crisis. The main channel driving the economic costs
of the requirements is through the bank credit market, in which higher lending rates reduce
output levels. Here, we quantify the cost of the new requirements as a negative function of the
lending spread.
Comparing with previous studies, the rst contribution of this paper is to estimate the long-
term economic impact of both tighter capital and liquidity requirements for the UK economy.
Second, we calculate the capital and liquidity ratios based on the Basel III denitions, rather
than the more commonly used Tier 1 capital ratio and the Loans-to-Deposits liquidity ratio.
Third, we choose a non-linear-in-factor probit model including bank capital and liquidity to
forecast the probability of a bank crisis by considering the imperfect substitutability between
UK banks' capital and liquidity. And fourth, we estimate the long-run cost of the require-
ments with a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM), which shows holding higher capital and
liquidity would reduce output by a small amount but increase bank protability in the long
run.
We use quarterly data over the period 1997:q1 to 2010:q2. The bank-specic data were
collected from Bankscope and banks' annual reports. The macroeconomic data were col-
lected from the the Bank of England (BOE) database, the Oce for National Statistics (ONS)
database, and the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database. Our maximum temporary
net benet and permanent net benet is shown to be 1.284% of pre-crisis GDP 3 and 35.484%
respectively when the tangible common equity ratio stays at 10%. Assuming all UK banks also
meet the Basel III long-term liquidity requirements, the temporary net benet and permanent
net benet will be 0.347% and 14.318% of pre-crisis GDP respectively.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 reviews the existing literature on the
economic benets and costs of the Basel III requirements. Section 3 explains the data used.
Section 4 describes the methodology we use to estimate benet and cost. Section 5 presents
3The pre-crisis GDP in this paper is expressed as real GDP in 2007:q4.
2the main empirical results. And Section 6 summarises and concludes.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Economic Benets
The economic benets of the enhanced capital and liquidity regulations reect mainly the
fact that a more robust banking system would be less prone to crises, which can impose large
losses in terms of forgone output. This section synthesizes the evidence on these two eects. It
rstly reviews the literature on the impact of capital and liquidity regulation on the probability
of systemic banking crises occurring. It then proceeds to review the approaches adopted to
assess the GDP loss associated with a specic banking crisis.
2.1.1. The impact of capital and liquidity requirements on the probability of banking crises
occurring
Table 1 shows the main methods used to estimate the relationship between regulatory
requirements and the probability of a banking crisis occurring in a given year; reduced-form
models, calibrated portfolio models and calibrated stress test models. The results, summarised
in Table 1, point to a clear role for capital. But the impact of liquidity is addressed by far
fewer models, even though liquidity has been shown to be just as important for maintaining
the stability of banking systems. It is worth noting that the denitions of both bank capital
and bank liquidity used in these models are not exactly the same as those specied by Basel
III. We will discuss this in greater detail below.
Barrell et al. (2009), Kato et al. (2010) and Wong et al. (2010) adopt reduced-from probit
models for a panel of countries over a period of years. The probability of a crisis occuring
is based on the statistical relationship between the incidence of crisis episodes and aggregate
data on bank capital and liquidity, as well as other variables that serve as controls. Comparing
with Barrell et al. (2009), Kato et al. (2010) use a general-to-specic approach to choose the
preferred specication by considering the substitutability between Japanese banks' capital and
liquidity.
Tarashev and Zhu (2008) use a standard portfolio credit risk model to estimate links be-
tween capital and the probability of bank default, which is treated as a signal for a systemic
banking crisis. They interpret the banking system as a portfolio of banks and estimate the
loss distribution arising from bank defaults. Bank failures are correlated and the correlations
can be estimated from market information.
Gauthier et al. (2010) use a stress testing model to generate loss distributions under severe
but plausible scenarios. This methodology assumes losses arise from systemic spillover eects,
either from counter-party exposures in the interbank markets or from asset re sales that aect
3the mark-to-market value of banks' portfolios. In this context, a greater capital buer can only
be benecial insofar as it helps the bank avoid asset re sales. Therefore, the probability of
bank asset re sales, which depends on holdings of capital, is a key trigger of systemic banking
crises. Meanwhile, Miles et al. (2011) use an assumed probability distribution for changes in
annual GDP to calculate the probability of a banking crisis occurring in any given year for
dierent levels of bank capital. They generate distributions of GDP with added stressed shocks
by using calibrated parameters.
However, neither the portfolio model nor the stress testing models can assess the impact of
liquidity requirements. With this in mind, we estimate the reduced-form relationship between
the probability of a banking crisis occurring and UK banks' capital and liquidity ratios.
2.1.2. Expected GDP loss associated with a banking crisis
The paths of GDP over the dierent phases of a banking crisis are generally measured from
the peak of the business cycle prior to the crisis to a subsequent trough point for GDP; the
end phase is when GDP remains on a new sustainable path. Therefore, two types of GDP
loss might occur in a specic banking crisis. The rst one is a temporary GDP loss since the
path of GDP may regain its pre-crisis trend growth rate. The second is a permanent GDP loss
because of a permanently lower GDP growth trend than the pre-crisis one (see Figure 1).
Bordo et al. (2001), Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2000), and Hutchison and Noy (2002) measure
the temporary GDP loss from the pre-crisis cycle peak to the point when the pre-crisis trend
growth rate has been retrieved. Cecchetti et al. (2009), Laeven and Valencia (2008), and
Haugh et al. (2009) measure the cumulative temporary GDP loss through the period of a
given banking crisis, which comprises the peak to trough loss of output plus the loss of output
until the pre-crisis trend growth rate has been reached. Hoggarth et al. (2002) measure both
types of temporary GDP loss. Their ndings are summarised in Table 2.
In constrast, Cerra and Saxena (2008), R oger et al. (2010), Furceri and Zdzienicka (2010)
and Barrell et al. (2010) calculate the permanent GDP loss from the pre-crisis cycle peak to
the point when the new, lower trend growth rate has been established as well as the cumulative
permanent loss in GDP, over the pre-crisis cycle peak to trough period plus the period until the
new lower growth trend rate is established. Meanwhile, Boyd et al. (2005) and Haldane (2010)
calculate just the cumulative permanent loss in GDP. Again, their ndings are presented in
Table 2.
2.2. Economic Costs
The main channel through which changes in capital and liquidity regulation aect economic
activity is via an increase in the cost of bank intermediation. Banks will increase lending
4rates to compensate for the cost of holding more capital and liquidity. Owing to imperfect
substitutability between bank credit and other forms of market nancing, this leads to lower
investment and lower output.
The computation of the steady-state economic costs of higher capital and liquidity require-
ments for the level of output are based on a variety of macroeconomic models (see Table 3
for the details and ndings of the authors). The models dier in many respects. First, they
refer to dierent countries or areas. Second, some are almost fully estimated, whereas others
are entirely calibrated (the value of the coecients are taken from unrelated, generally mi-
croeconomic, studies casting light on the specic parameters). Finally, some models explicitly
feature a banking sector and a role for bank capital and liquidity, while others do not.
Gambacorta (2010) and Wong et al. (2010) use an error correction model to estimate long-
term output reduction caused by higher lending spreads arising from stronger capital and
liquidity standards. The main advantage of this approach is that it helps to disentangle loan
demand and loan supply factors in the steady state. Based on aggregated historical data,
it can establish the long-run relationship between capital (or liquidity) and the reduction in
output. The main disadvantage is that it does not allow for the conduct of counter-factual
experiments, such as the introduction of countercyclical capital buers (BCBS, 2010b).
R oger et al. (2010) calibrate the costs for an Euro Area crisis from both higher capital and
liquidity using a DSGE model including nancial frictions and a banking sector. Their paper
features banks' balance sheets and credit markets explicitly. It provides a unied framework to
analyze how changes in capital and liquidity requirements aect banking conditions (spreads
and lending) and output. DSGE models also allow counter-factual policy experiments in a
conceptually consistent manner. However, since it is fully calibrated, the estimation process
is often daunting. And the other DSGE models cited here (i.e. Van den Heuvel (2008),Dellas
et al. (2010), and Meh and Moran (2008)) are still experimental, so that they are not fully
integrated to the policy-making process.
Locarno (2004) uses semi-structural models; however, these models do not directly incor-
porate banks' balance sheet conditions and income statements as input variables. Instead,
these eects must be incorporated into other variables, such as lending spreads. This means
that the rst step is to map the impact of the higher capital and liquidity requirements on
lending spreads. Therefore, it is dicult to estimate the impact of the cost eect of capital
(or liquidity) on output. Moreover, the computation of long-term eects is dicult due to the
size of the models, and cost can be approximated only by simulations over a reasonably large
number of years.
Miles et al. (2011) assume an alternative channel through which changes in capital aect
5economic activity, that is via an increase in the funding cost of bank intermediation. The
rising bank funding costs (typically referred to in corporate nance theory as the weighted
average cost of capital, WACC) are passed on, one-for-one, by banks to their customers, who
will suer a higher cost of capital for external nancing. They assume that output is produced
with rms' capital and labour in a way described by a single standard production function.
The steady-state output will be changed by higher bank capital requirements. Therefore, they
apply a production function with a calibrated constant elasticity of substitution to estimate
the calibrated output loss caused by banks' higher WACC.
To estimate the long-term cost eect of both higher bank capital and liquidity requirements,
we follow Gambacorta (2010) and use a Vector Error Correction Model to estimate the long-run
relationships among a small set of variables for the UK. This analysis focuses on the long run
eects on interest rates, lending, GDP and bank protability of the Basel III requirements. It
establishes a framework to estimate the eects of higher bank capital and liquidity on output
and bank protability.
3. Data description
3.1. Denitions of Capital and Liquidity
It is crucial to clarify the denitions of capital and liquidity before doing empirical work.
In most recent banking sector research, the Tier 1 capital ratio 4 , is the variable chosen to
represent bank capital. Likewise, the most commonly used variable for liquidity is the Loans-
to-Deposits ratio. However, under Basel III, the focus is on very dierent ratios.
For the capital base, the rst breakthrough in Basel III is to focus on the ratio of tangible
common equity capital (i.e. paid-up capital plus retained earnings net of regulatory adjust-
ments) to risk-weighted assets (TCE/RWA), since tangible common equity is the highest-





Therefore, any analysis about the Basel III capital requirements should use TCE/RWA as the
key capital variable. However, since this variable is only available for a few bank since 2009,
most studies have used the core Tier 1 ratio in their analyses, translating the core Tier 1
ratio into the TCE/RWA ratio by assuming a linear link between the two in order to assess
4The overall Tier 1 capital ratio includes common equity plus other qualifying nancial instruments having a
loss-absorbing capacity on a `going concern' basis in the numerator, with risk weighted assets (RWA) comprising
the denominator.
6the long-run impact of stronger Basel III capital requirements. Luckily for us, we are able
to get accurate historical UK bank data for the TCE/RWA ratio based on information from
Bankscope database and UK banks' annual reports.
For liquidity, Basel III evaluates banks' long-term 5 liquidity adequacy using a `net stable
funding ratio' (NSFR), which is the available amount of stable funding (ASF) divided by the
required amount of stable funding (RSF). The ASF includes equity, debt and other liabilities
(Liabs) with an eective maturity of 1 year or greater, 85% of stable deposits (StbDeposits)
with residual maturity less than 1 year, and 70% of less stable deposits (OtherDeposits) with a
residual matuirty of less than one year. The RSF includes 5% of government debt (GovetDebt),
50% of Corporate loans (CorpLoans) with less than 1 year to maturity, 85% of Retail loans
(RetLoans) having a maturity of less than 1 year and 100% of Other Assets (excluding cash
and interbank loans, which attract a 0% weighting) 6. Accordingly,
NSFR =
Equity + Debt1yr + Liabs1yr + 85%StbDeposits<1yr + 70%OtherDeposits<1yr
5%GovtDebt + 50%CorpLoans<1yr + 85%RetLoans<1yr + 100%OtherAssets
(2)
Basel III requires that the NSFR should be more than 1 which means the sources of funding
are bigger than the uses of funding. Previous studies have used the same approach to assess
the impact of Basel III's liquidity requirements by translating the NSFR into a Loans-to-
Deposits ratio. Wong et al. (2010) estimate a one percentage-point increase in NSFR roughly
corresponds to a decrease of 46 basis points in the Loans-to-Deposits ratio on average, with
the assumption that there is a linear relationship between the two ratios. Even though it is
impossible for us to estimate the relationship between the NSFR and the Loans-to-Deposits
ratio with a small sample of data, we can get an approximated NSFR by checking UK banks'
historical balance sheets and income statements. Accordingly,
NSFR 
Equity + Snrdebt1yr + Liabs1yr + 85%RetDeposits<1yr + 70%OtherDeposits<1yr
5%Itbloans<1yr + 50%DebtSecurities<1yr + 85%AdvLoans<1yr + OtherAssets
where Snrdebt is senior debts, RetDeposits are retail deposits, Itbloans are interbank loans,
and AdvLoans are advances and loans. Given the recent global nancial crisis, it might be
5The BCBS also uses a `liquidity coverage ratio' (LCR) to assess the short-term (i.e. up to 30 days) liquidity
adequacy of banks-see BCBS (2010a).
6N.B. We have used the December 2009 denition of the NSFR here (BCBS, 2009) to allow for comparision
with other studies of its eects, especially (BCBS, 2010b). For the nal version see (BCBS, 2010a).
7too optimistic to exclude cash and interbank loans from the RSF. Therefore, we assume 5% of
interbank loans would be funded by ASF. Similarly, since we do not clearly know the portfolio
structure of each bank's asset holdings, we apply a 50% discount factor to all less than 1 year
Debt Securities, which includes both Government Debt and Corporate Loans. Given the 5%
discount factor applied by Basle III to Government Debt, our approximated NSFR is thus less
than the real NSFR.
3.2. Data
We use quarterly data over the period 1997:q1 to 2010:q2. The bank-specic data were
collected from Bankscope and banks' annual reports. Tables 4 and 5 show that we included
only 12 (17) out of a total of 190 UK banks 7 from the Bankscope database for the calculation
of the industry capital (liquidity) ratio, because of the unbalanced data limitation. However,
those selected banks accounted for 91.48% of total UK bank assets in 2010. The macroeconomic
data were collected from the the Bank of England (BOE) database, the Oce for National
Statistics (ONS) database, and the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database. Detailed
description of variables is in Table 6.
To estimate the probitability of a banking crisis occurring, we use a dependent variable-
binary banking crisis dummy (one for 2008:q1-2010:q2 and zero otherwise). There are two
reasons to identify the rst quarter of 2008 as the beginning of the systemic banking crisis in
the United Kingdom. First of all, it is the peak point of the business cycle prior to the crisis.
Second, the Bank of England announced in February 2008 that it would accept a broad range
of mortgage-backed securities and swap those for Treasury Bills for a period of one year to
aid banks with liquidity problems. And the reason for identifying the second quarter of 2010
as the end of the systemic banking crisis is because its real GDP growth rate had caught up
with its pre-crisis level. Finally,the explanatory variables in this model include the sample UK
banks' average tangible common equity capital ratio (TCE/RWA), the average UK banks' net
stable funding ratio (NSFR), real estate price ination ratio (RPI) and the ratio of current
account balance to nominal GDP (CA).
The reason for including real estate price ination has been explained by Barrell et al.
(2009). Basically, real estate price ination , rather than other nancial factors such as interest
rates or returns on assets, has a superior predictive power than the others. Or, as Kato et al.
(2010) argue, the RPI may contain a larger information set than the others. For instance, when
7There were 121 incorporated banks operating in the UK, according to the FSA, on 30 June 2011, and 69
building societies. However, this sample does not include banks incorporated outside the UK but accepting
deposits through a branch in the UK.
8housing markets are booming, interest rates would quite frequently remain low as a backdrop
to those asset market bubbles. Finally, the reason for including the current account balance
ratio is more straightforward. We know from history that a banking crisis usually tended to
coincide with a currency crisis, which were well acknowledged as the `twin crises'. Given that
a large current account decit can frequently precede a currency crisis, the CA term can thus
also predict a banking crisis.
To estimate the steady-state economic cost, we use the following variables: real GDP and
real 8 bank lending (L) to private sector, which includes lending to both banking and non-bank
nancial rms; the real short term interest rate (i   ), as given by the 3-month interbank
rate minus CPI ination; the lending spread (r   i), as given by the 3-month clearing banks'
lending rate for dierent types of loans minus the 3-month interbank rate; the average return
on equity (ROE) of UK banks; the average UK banks' tangible common equity capital ratio
(TCE/RWA); and the average UK banks' net stable funding ratio (NSFR).
4. Methodology
4.1. Estimation of the economic benet of new capital and liquidity requirements
The benet of the new requirements is measured as the reduction in the probability of a
nancial crisis occuring multiplied by the expected loss arising from a one-o banking crisis.
Thus,
Benet = Pr  expected loss from a nancial crisis (3)
Therefore, estimation of the expected long-term benet from the regulatory reforms consists
of two parts. The rst part involves an estimation of the impact of higher capital and liquidity
requirements on the probability of a banking crisis occurring. The second part is an estimation
of output losses arising from a one-o banking crisis.
4.1.1. The impact of higher capital and liquidity requirements on the probability of a banking
crisis occurring
Normally, in the binary-state model, the probability depends on each explanatory variable
linearly:
Prt = (iTCE/RWAt + iNSFRt + iZit) (4)
where TCE/RWAt and NSFRt denote the tangible common equity capital ratio and net stable
funding ratio, respectively, and Zt represents a vector of macroeconomic variables, including
real estate price ination ratio (RPIt) and the current account balance ratio (CAt). All of
8The real bank lending is calculated by seasonal adjusted banking lending over one plus ination rate.
9these variables are in log form.  denotes a cumulative normal distribution function typically
used in the standard probit models. Accordingly, Pr denotes the probability of a nancial
crisis materializing.
However, linear formation, as in the plain-vanilla probit models, gives rise to some dicul-
ties in estimating the cumulative impacts of the regulatory tools used to reduce the probability
of crises occurring (Kato et al., 2010). The linear-probit model, imposing the perfect substi-
tution between variables, requires a bank to make a take-it-or-leave-it choice between capital
and liquidity. But, both factors are of equal importance to a bank. Indeed, liquidity might be
even more important than capital during a systemic banking crisis. As a result, we employ a
slightly more exible (and sensible) form, a non-linear probit model, with a few cross-terms
to allow for imperfect substitutability between capital and liquidity indicators. The estimated
benchmark specication of the non-linear-in-factor probit model can be expressed as
Prt = (iTCE/RWAt  NSFRt + iZit) (5)
4.1.2. Estimation of output losses arising from a one-o banking crisis
As noted earlier, the paths of GDP over the dierent phases of a banking crisis of relevance
are from the peak of the business cycle prior to the crisis to a subsequent trough point of GDP;
the end phase is when GDP returns to a new path. Therefore, two types of GDP loss might
occur in a specic banking crisis. The rst one is a temporary GDP loss since the path of GDP
may regain its pre-crisis trend growth rate. The second is a permanent GDP loss because of a
permanently lower GDP growth trend than before the crisis. Both possibilities are examined
in our paper.
4.2. Estimation of the output loss arising from higher capital and liquidity requirements
Since it is dicult to measure the long-run relationships between variables during the
nancial turmoil post 2008, we use quarterly data for the period of 1997:q1-2007:q4 in the
VECM model. Figure 2 compares the behavior of real GDP and real bank credit. It shows a
high correlation between the two series, suggesting the possibility that they have a long-run
relationship. Kashyap et al. (1993) mention that better economic conditions usually increase
the number of protable projects in terms of expected net present value and hence increase the
demand for credit. The behavior of the spread and the real short term interest rate are shown
in Figure 3. As can be seen, the spreads remained extremely low over the decade under easy
bank lending conditions, as did real interest rates. However, a year before the 2008 nancial
turmoil began, the lending spreads were at a ten year high. It was a warning sign of future
systemic nancial instability. As can been in Figure 4, both the capital ratio and the liquidity
ratio remained quite low over the preiod, mostly because of the widespread use of securitization
10techniques and cheap wholesale funding. While the signicant decrease in bank protability
from 2001 to 2002 is due to the fragile nancial system, especially against the background of
the 11th September terrorist attack, the collapse of Enron and Argentina's default. To reduce
the heteroskedastic problem, we also take logarithmic forms of real GDP (Y ), real bank lending
(L), return on equity (ROE), the capital ratio (TCE/RWA) and the liquidity ratio (NSFR).
In order to estimate the the output loss arising from higher capital and liquidity require-
ments, we rstly set these seven variables in a VAR system in which all variables are treated
as endogenous:





t  V WN(0;) (6)
where zt = [Y;i   ;r   i;L;ROE;NSFR;TCE/RWA]. The deterministic part of the model
includes a constant and t is a vector of white noise residuals. The number of lags(p) has been
set equal to 3 based on the Akaike information criteria (AIC). Normality of the VAR may be
achieved with the dummy for 1999:q1 and 2004:q1.
Based on the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test, we found that all of these data have
one unit root. The I(1) nature of the variables included in zt may imply existing cointegrating
relationships. Equation (6) therefore can be rearranged as a reduced-form error correction
model:
zt = (;zt 1) +
p 1 X
k=1
 kzt k + dumt + t
t = 1;2:::;T
 = (1   I) = 
0
(7)
This framework can be used to apply Johansen's trace test to verify the order of integration
of the matrix . In fact, the rank of  determines the number of cointegrating vectors r such
that  is an nr matrix of loading coecients and  is an nr matrix of cointegrating vectors.
The results show the presence of four cointegrating vectors in the model (see Table 7). So
there might be four possible long term relationships amongst the variables.
The rst long run relationship represents the banks' loan supply curve. Freixas and Rochet
(1997) argue that each bank sets the lending rate as the sum of the exogenous cost of the bank's
renancing on the money market, other costs (such as bank capital and liquidity requirements)
11and a constant mark-up in a model of imperfect competition. Therefore, a bank's spread-setting
can be represented as:
r   i = 0 + 1TCE/RWA + 2NSFR (8)
The second long run relationship is a Commodities and Credit (CC) curve (Bernanke and
Blinder, 1988), where the IS curve is modied to take account of the existence of the credit
market. Under the assumption of the imperfect substitutability between loans and other forms
of rms' nancing, an increase in the lending spread captures a tightening in loan supply that
should produce a drop in investment and output. The CC curve has the following form:
Y = 0 + 1(i   ) + 2(r   i) + 3ROE (9)
The third long term relationship is a lending demand curve. Demand for bank lending should be
a positive function of real GDP and a negative function of the spread. Similar to Gambacorta
(2010), we suppose the existence of a log-linear long run relationship of the following type:
L = 0 + 1Y + 2(r   i) (10)
The fourth long term relationship is the bank protability equation. A bank's prot depends
on lending volume and the spreads:
ROE = 0 + 1L + 2(r   i) + 2(i   ) (11)
5. Results
5.1. Economic Benet
The probit model estimation results are set out in Table 8. We took a general-to-specic
approach to nally choose the most preferred specication (i.e. spec 12 in Table 8). All
coecients have the expected signs. The negative coecient of the non-linear-in-factors imply
that higher capital and liquidity requirements can prevent the occurrence of a banking crisis.
The positive sign of the estimated coecient on RPIt shows that higher real estate price
ination would increase the probability of crisis. And the insignicance of the CAt term
implies a limited chance of a currency crisis following the 2008 banking crisis in the UK.
The non-linear-in-factor model does not only capture the high probability of a crisis oc-
curing in 2008 (see Figure 5), but also provides useful information to help assess the cumula-
tive impact of the multiple regulatory requirements. Table 9 shows the relationship between
TCE/RWA (or NSFR) and changes in the probability of a crisis occuring. We rstly estimated
the base-line probability of a crisis at the mean level of all variables. The average UK histor-
ical TCE/RWA (or NSFR) is 6% (or 0.95). Holding other factors constant, a 1% increase in
12the TCE/RWA ratio will reduce the probability of a crisis occuring by around 3.211%. The
probability of a crisis will be reduced by 4.996% when the capital ratio increases to 12%. If
the NSFR ratio remains at 1, the reduction in the probability of a crisis will be 2.036%.
We calculate that the cumulative temporary GDP loss associated with a systemic banking
crisis from 2008:q1 to 2010:q2 is 10% of pre-crisis UK GDP. Using a conservative discount factor
of 5% (i.e.the same as that used by BCBS (2010b)), the converted cumulative permanent GDP
loss is estimated to be 210% 9 (see Table 10). Using the probability of crisis estimated by the
model presented in the previous section, it is straightforward to quantify the marginal benet
from raising capital (or liquidity) requirements by increaments of one percent. Tables 11
and 12 summarise the economic benets of higher capital and liquidity requirements. If the
TCE/RWA catio stays between 7% and 12%, the range of temporary expected benet will be
from 1.102% to 1.714%, and the range of the permanent expected benet will be from 23.136%
to 35.997%. If the NSFR stays at 1, the temporary and permanent expected benets will be
0.699% and 14.670% respectively.
5.2. Economic Cost
These are the estimated long run relationships from the VECM model (with standard er-
rors in brackets):
r   i = 17:83 + 5:27TCE/RWA + 10:04NSFR
(1:135) (4:083)
(12)
Y = 5:8   0:084(r   i)   0:216(i   ) + 3:04ROE
(0:027) (0:021) (0:420)
(13)
L =  11:75 + 3:21Y + 0:15(r   i)
(0:185) (0:021)
(14)
ROE =  0:074 + 0:11L + 0:73(r   i) + 0:18(i   )
(0:028) (0:072) (0:074)
(15)
As for the estimated coecients, the long run elasticities between the spread and the two
regulatory variables are quite low. For a 1% increase in the capital (or liquidity) ratio , the
spread increases by 5% (10%). As expected, there is a negative relationship between GDP and
9Assuming a current temporary loss of (), a growth rate (g) equal to 0 and an interest rate (r) equal to 5%
in the innite horizon, then the present value of the future permanent loss can be calculated as (
1+r
r g).
13both the real interest rate and the spread. The semi-elasticity between GDP and the lending
spread is -0.084. The long-run elasticity between lending and GDP is equal to 3.21. Bank
lending, spreads and the short term real interest rate all positively impact bank protability.
The long-run elasticity between ROE and lending is 0.11, and the semi-elasticitiy between
ROE and the lending spread (or real short term interest rate) is 0.73 (or 0.18).
Table 13 summarises the long-run impact of TCE/RWA (or NSFR) on output, based on
the estimation results. Other things being equal, a one percentage-point increase in the capital
ratio will cause a 0.238% loss of pre-crisis output. The maximum reduction in output will be
0.598% when the capital ratio increases to 15%. If the NSFR liquidity requirement is met, the
loss of output will be 0.352%.
5.3. Net Benet
The estimated net benet for the United Kingdom is dependent on whether banking crises
are assumed to result in a temporary or permanent GDP loss. As mentioned in previous
sections, the estimated cumulative temporary GDP loss is 10% of pre-crisis UK GDP, and the
permanent GDP loss during the recent crisis is estimated to be 210%. The expected economic
benet can thus be quantied as the product of the marginal reduction in probability of a
crisis occuring because of increasing capital (or liquidity) requirements and the two types of
expected GDP loss arising from a banking crisis. From Table 14, we can see that the maximum
net benet (temporary plus permanent) occurs when the TCE/RWA ratio is set at 10%. At
this capital level, the temporary net benet and permanent net benet will be 1.284% and
35.484% of pre-crisis GDP respectively. Assuming all UK banks meet the new long-term
liquidity requirement, the temporary net benet and permanent net benet will be 0.347%
and 14.318% respectively (see Table 15).
6. Summary and Conclusions
In summary, the Basel III reforms are expected to generate a signicant positive net benet
for the United Kingdom economy. Our estimated optimal level of tangible common equity (the
highest quality, loss-absorbing capital) is 10% of risk weighted assets, which is higher than the
normal Basel III target for the minimum common equity capital ratio of 7% 10, and even that
set for `systemically important nancial institutions' (SIFIs) 11. This nding supports those
who argue for tighter capital standards under Basel III, at least as far as the UK is concerned.
10The target, which has to be met by Janurary 2019, comprises a minimum 4.5% common equity capital ratio
requirement (to be met by January 2015) and a minimum 2.5% conservation buer requirment.
11The BCBS agreed in June 2011 to phase in (between 2016 and 2019) a capital surcharge of up to 2.5% of
RWA for such institutions.
14In addition, we estimate the maximum net benet when banks also meet the Basel III
long-term liquidity requirements (i.e. when the NSFR stays at 1). Our results prove there is a
clear role for liquidity to prevent banking crises and economic downturns. Overally, our results
are consistent with the proposition that the reforms are likely to increase nancial stability in
the UK by strengthening the quality of both banks' capital bases and funding structures.
Our estimated temporary net benet is similar to the average estimation for selected
economies of the BCBS (2010b). However, the permanent net benet is higher than the
average permanent net benet calculated by the BCBS (2010b). The temporary net benet
is estimated by us to range from 0.864% to 1.314% compared to the BCBS estimates of 0 to
1.96%; while the permanent net benet is estimated to range from 22.898% to 35.507% com-
pared to the BCBS estimates of 0 to 5.90%. The reason for the higher expected permanent
benet is that our estimated permanent GDP loss is 210%, which is higher than the average
estimate of 158% of the BCBS (2010b).
We acknowledge, however, that the paper has several limitations. First, because only one
UK banking crisis has occurred since 1997, we cannot use out-of-sample tests to evaluate the
forecasting ability of the non-linear-in-factor probit model. Second, other possible economic
benets and costs arising from the Basel III requirements have not been taken into account
in this study due to diculties in quantication 12. And third, the estimated benets (or
costs) of the NSFR requirements are sensitive to the assumptions used to calculate the NSFR.
Notwithstanding this, we do our best to quantify the long-term economic impact of the new
requirements for the UK economy in one of the rst stand-alone country analyses of the com-
bined impact of the recently-agreed changes to the international standards for banks' capital
and liquidity.
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18Tables
Table 1: Crisis prediction/simulation models
Article Model Reference Bank Bank Main






yes yes Increasing the levels of capital and liq-
uidity by 1% would have reduced the
probability of a crisis in the UK by




Reduced Japan yes yes By introducing a 1% increase in the
capital ratio, the probability of a crisis
occuring will fall by 3.10% without any
increase in liquidity. The probability of
a crisis occuring will fall by 2.8% when
a 1% increase in the capital ratio as






yes yes Further reductions in the probability
of a banking crisis from an increase in
the tangible common equity ratio be-
yond 7% may not be signicant. The
marginal benet becomes virtually zero







yes no Increasing capital ratios from 6% to
9%, without any increase in liquidity,
decreases the likelihood of a systemic






UK yes no The probability of a crisis occurring
will fall from 4.57% to 0.75%, if banks






Canada yes no Increasing capital ratios from 7% to
8%, without any increase in liquidity,
decreases the likelihood of a systemic
crisis by two thirds (e.g.from 4.7% to
1.7%).
19Table 2: Studies looking at the cost of a banking crisis (relative to pre-crisis GDP)
Study Estimated mean losses Estimated cumulative losses
Temporary losses
Bordo et al. (2001) 6
Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2000) 7
Hutchison and Noy (2002) 10
Laeven and Valencia (2008) 20
Haugh et al. (2009) 21
Cecchetti et al. (2009) 18
Hoggarth et al. (2002) 14 16
Permanent losses
Cerra and Saxena (2008) 7.5 158
R oger et al. (2010) 9.4 197
Furceri and Zdzienicka (2010) 4.5 210
Barrell et al. (2010) 2 42
Boyd et al. (2005) 302
Haldane (2010) 200
20Table 3: Long-term cost estimation/calibration models
Article Model Reference Estimated Bank Bank Main ndings
type country /calibrated capital liquidity
Gambacorta
(2010)
VECM US estimated yes yes The impact of changes in capi-
tal and liquidity ratio on long-





estimated yes no A 1% increase in capital will
reduce output by 4.2 basis
points in the long run.




calibrated yes yes A 6% increase in capital with
no changes of liquidity will re-
duce output by 0.81%. Fiscal
policy appears to matter for
the impact of banking crises





DSGE US calibrated yes no The welfare cost of current
capital adequacy regulation is
found to be equivalent to a
permanent loss in consump-
tion of between 0.1% and 1%.
Dellas et al.
(2010)
DSGE US estimated no yes Monetary policy becomes less
accommodating to liquidity





DSGE US calibrated yes no Bank capital increases an
economy's ability to absorb
shocks. Following adverse
shocks, well-capitalized bank-
ing sectors experience smaller






Italy estimated no no The mean results are the same





UK calibrated yes no Doubling capital (from 8.4%
to 16.8%) would reduce the
output 15% where there is no
tax eect and 45% M-M o-
set.
21Table 4: Sample of UK banks used to calculate the capital ratio
Incorporated banks in the UK Building Societies





Lloyds TSB Bank plc
NatWest Bank plc
Northern Rock plc




Table 5: Sample of UK banks used to calculate the liquidity ratio
Incorporated banks in the UK Building Societies
Barclays Bank plc Britannia Building Society
Clydesdale Bank plc Bradford & Bingley Building Society
Co-operative Bank plc Nationwide Building Society
HSBC Bank plc Newcastle Building Society
Investec Bank plc Skipton Building Society
Lloyds TSB Bank plc West Bromwich Building Society
NatWest Bank plc
Northern Rock plc




22Table 6: Description of Variables and Sources Used
Variable Denitions Source Dataset
Name/Code
TCE/RWA The quarterly average ratio of tangible com-
mon equity to risk-weighted assets.
Bankscope
& FAR
NSFR The quarterly average net stable funding ra-




ROE The quarterly average return on equity ratio. Bankscope
i The quarterly average 3-month interbank
rate.
BOE IUQAAMIJ
 The quarterly ination rate (CPI % change). IFS 64::::XZF
r The quarterly average 3-month clearing
banks ' lending rate for dierent types of
loans.
IFS 60p:::ZF
RPI The quarterly real estate price ination rate
(% change of real estate price index).
ONS rpi1q
CA The quarterly ratio of current account bal-
ance to nominal GDP.
ONS pnbp:B:HBOP
& YBHA
GDP(Y ) United Kingdom's quarterly real GDP. IFS 99B.RWF
L Quarterly amount of real banking lending to
private sector.
BOE & IFS LPQVQJM &
64::::XZF
Note: * FAR is Financial Annual Reports of UK banks.
23Table 7: Johansen Cointegration Test (Trace)
test 10pct 5pct 1pct
r <= 6 7.16 7.52 9.24 12.97
r <= 5 11.51 13.75 15.67 20.2
r <= 4 23.47 19.77 22 26.81
r <= 3 29.54 25.56 28.14 33.24
r <= 2 31.93 31.66 34.4 39.79
r <= 1 42.65 37.45 40.3 46.82
r = 0 61.71 43.25 46.45 51.91
Note: Trace test indicates 4 cointegrating equation(s)
at the 0.01 level.
24Table 8: Estimation Results
Variable / Nest Linear-term-only Nonlinear-term-included
Spec 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Pr(crisis)=0 or 1
TCE/RWA*NSFR 844.36 NA NA NA 2.06 0.58 -1.99 -4.383*
TCE/RWA 42.31 0.48 -2.7 -6.24* 1.78 0.48 -2.7 -6.24*
NSFR 2360.02 3.44 10.43 19.41 8.62 3.44 10.43 19.41
RPI 4.77 0.038 -1.41 -3.14* 0.81 0.04 -1.41 -3.14* 0.85 0.05 1.24 2.518*
CA -0.02 -0.005 0.5172 0.88* 0.1 -0.006 0.52 0.88* 0.004 -0.049 -0.3 -0.447
lag 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
Log likelihood -8.11 -16.8 -15.19 -12.51 -15.68 -16.81 -15.2 -12.51 -15.84 -16.84 -15.75 -14.22
Note: *denotes the 5% level of signicance.
2
5Table 9: The relationship between TCE/RWA (or NSFR) and changes in the probability of a
banking crisis occurring
TCE/RWA Reduction in the
probability of a
crisis
NSFR Reduction in the
probability of a
crisis
7% 3.211% 0.96 0.612%
8% 4.634% 0.97 1.020%
9% 4.930% 0.98 1.389%
10% 4.984% 0.99 1.727%





Table 10: Output losses associated with a banking crisis (as a percentage of pre-crisis GDP)
Dierence between GDP Cumulative
at beginning and end discounted
of period loss
Period from peak to trough 6
Period until growth rate recovers 4
Period from peak to end of crisis 10
Innite horizon 210
Notes: *assumes a conservative discount factor of 5%.
26Table 11: Economic benet of higher capital requirements











Table 12: Economic benet of higher liquidity requirements







Table 13: The relationship between TCE/RWA (or NSFR) and reduction in output
TCE/RWA Reduction in output NSFR Reduction in output
7% 0.238% 0.96 0.318%
8% 0.318% 0.97 0.327%
9% 0.377% 0.98 0.336%
10% 0.426% 0.99 0.344%





27Table 14: Economic impact of higher capital requirements
Temporary GDP loss Permanent GDP loss
TCE/RWA Expected Expected Net Expected Net
cost(%) benet(%) benet(%) benet(%) benet(%)
7% 0.238 1.102 0.864 23.136 22.898
8% 0.318 1.590 1.272 33.389 33.071
9% 0.377 1.691 1.314 35.521 35.144
10% 0.426 1.710 1.284 35.910 35.484
11% 0.468 1.713 1.245 35.975 35.507
12% 0.505 1.714 1.209 35.997 35.492
13% 0.539 1.714 1.175 35.997 35.458
14% 0.57 1.714 1.144 35.997 35.427
15% 0.598 1.714 1.116 35.997 35.399
Table 15: Economic impact of higher liquidity requirements
Temporary GDP loss Permanent GDP loss
NSFR Expected Expected Net Expected Net
cost(%) benet(%) benet(%) benet(%) benet(%)
0.96 0.318 0.210 -0.108 4.410 4.092
0.97 0.327 0.350 0.023 7.349 7.022
0.98 0.336 0.477 0.141 10.008 9.672
0.99 0.344 0.593 0.249 12.443 12.099
1 0.352 0.699 0.347 14.670 14.318
28Figures
Figure 1: Real UK GDP, 1997-2010
Note: The trend of real GDP is estimated by regressing the real GDP on a constant and a linear time trend.
29Figure 2: Bank lending and GDP, 1997-2007
Note: GDP is gross domestic product (output measure) at constant prices. The real bank lending series
includes lending to both banking and non-bank nancial rms.
30Figure 3: Short term real interest rates and lending spreads, 1997-2007
Note: The short term real interest rate is given by the 3-month interbank rate minus CPI ination. The
spread is the dierence between the lending rate and the 3-month interbank rate.
31Figure 4: Bank protability, the capital ratio and the liquidity ratio, 1997-2007
Note: The return on equity of UK banks is in real terms; and the tangible common equity capital ratio and
net stable funding ratio are calculated using data from Bankscope as well as banks' annual reports.
32Figure 5: Crisis Prediction
33